Control study based the agents compensation contracts designed channel
|School||Chongqing Technology and Business University|
|Keywords||channel control compensation contract design Principal-agent theory the effort of agent|
Marketing channels is an important way for Enterprises gaining competitive advantage,but the channel system consisting of producers,agents and other channel memberships who have many different profits is a loose alliance. In order to gain their own interests., channel memberships who are rational economic men inevitably generate a lot of Speculations, leding to the lower channel efficiency.In order to reduce the incidence of opportunistic behavior,we must effectively control the channels. In order to reduce the opportunistic behavior of agent ,The paper study Manufacturer as a principal how to control the channels through the design of compensation contract in the single- Principal and multi-agent relationship and multi - Principal and single–agent relationship. The paper mainly study compensation contract design model of single- Principal and multi-agent and compensation contract design model of multi - Principal and single–agent,focusing on the optimal setting of parameters in the Incentive mechanism and how this parameters influence the effort of the agent.Studies have show that: In the single- Principal and multi-agent relationship,if the Principal-agent model have Variable based on Comparative performance,the optimal effort of the agent have higher than if not;Optimal incentive factor have negative correlation with the degree of risk aversion of the agent, Exogenous random variable variance, Coefficient of the impact of Market random factors on the output ; Optimal incentive factor have Local positive correlation with the intensity of competition between agents. Only if the intensity of competition is limited in the a certain range,when the intensity of competition between agents is higher, Optimal incentive factor is bigger and the optimal effort of the agent is higher. In the multi– Principal and single–agent relationship, Optimal incentive factor have relationship with the degree of risk aversion of the agent, Coefficient of the impact of Market random factors on the output,the relatively incentive factor size of each Manufacturer,the output Coefficient of effort in the product of Manufacturer. The eoffort of agent for the product of Manufacturer 1 have positive correlation with incentive factor of Manufacturer 1, have negative correlation with incentive factor of Manufacturer 2, have positive correlation with the output Coefficient of effort in the product of Manufacturer 1.The incentive factor of Manufacturer 1 have positive correlation with incentive factor of Manufacturer 2, output Coefficient of effort in the product of Manufacturer 2.The empirical evidence that support the above conclusion is existed in the reality.