Analysis on Executive Officer Compensation Incentive System Performance-Based in Commercial Banks
|Keywords||joint-stock commercial bank executive officer compensation performance incentive|
In China, the compensation in financial field, especially the increasing high salary of bank senior executives, arouse dissatisfaction among public, and in turn lead to the implementation of compensation restriction. Compensation incentive mechanism is an important part of the senior executives’incentive mechanism of commercial banks. More appropriate compensation incentive not only inspires more potential from the senior executives, but also attracts more excellent senor executives. It is of great practical significance to enhance the foundation of human resource in the future development. The foundation of compensation is performance. No performance, no compensation. Therefore, this thesis attempts to analyze the senior executives’compensation from the perspective of performance.First, paper presents the research background and significance, and puts forward the structure of the thesis based on the literature review of the research both at home and abroad. Second, paper analyzes the present situation of the senior executives’incentive of commercial banks. The analysis involves the composition of bank senior executives’compensation and some problems in present compensation incentive. The results imply that there are some problems, namely, the inconsistency between the performance and the increase of compensation in executive offers’ compensation incentive, be lacking of long-term incentive and the large income gap among the executive offers of different bank. Paper analyzes the relation between compensation and performance. The subjects are the executive offers’compensation incentive of six listed joint-equity banks (China Merchants Bank, China Minsheng Bank, SPD bank. Shenzhen Development Bank, Huaxia Bank and Industrial Bank). The thesis investigates the seven years’ financial data in the annual reports of the six banks from 2003 to 2009 to analyze executive offers’ compensation from the aspect of performance by means of panel data model. The results show that the increase of executive offers’compensation largely depends on the expansion of scale, but not the improvement of capacity of profitability and the asset quality. Third, paper designs briefly the compensation incentive system of commercial banks based on the problems found out in Chapter Four by using AHP. The aim of design is to minimize the cost that was caused by the information asymmetry between the executive officers and shareholders. It can realize the maximum of the executive officers’ self-benefits while achieve the maximum of shareholders’value. The principle of design is to combine the safety of bank’s assets and development of bank without affecting the performance of executive officers. The design includes annual pay, stock option and benefit plan.This paper analyzes the executives’compensation incentive by establishing panel data model from performance. On which paper put forward the resolutions. There is a creation at the way and perspective choosing.