Systemic risks of cross-border banking supervision research
|Keywords||Systemic risk Multinational banks Regulatory|
In this paper, from the host country perspective, the study of cross-border banking supervision issues. Inspired by the concept of regulation of the Basel Committee, in order to highlight the purpose of the regulation, of the \Generation of systemic risk, due to the macroeconomic and banking sector itself two factors. This article only regulatory factors beyond our control - the banking industry itself - to find the root causes of systemic risk. Concluded: Bank of asymmetric information, negative externalities, and the interaction between the two, making the bank the rapid spread of risk, lost the confidence of the market or even crash. This is basically similar to the conclusions drawn from the general theory of regulatory, which provides a theoretical basis for the regulation is to solve the problem of prominent multinational bank information asymmetries and negative externalities. For how to regulate \Regulatory practices, and regulatory studies using this sequence. However, the authors believe that the study seems to be more appropriate to take the reverse order. The reason to exit the market supervision, that is the first of the \Second, the moral hazard problem of the financial safety net, making it easy to evolve into a systemic financial risk. Therefore, to prevent the risk of moral hazard caused by the financial safety net, provides a theoretical basis for the market operation regulation, market access regulation. Third, withdraw from the market regulators yet unified, the weakest link of the research to exit the market regulators on the regulatory aspects of the first, is conducive to causing the interest and attention of the researchers. Therefore, from a theoretical clues, the authors follow this line of thought: the financial safety net negative externalities, information asymmetry caused by the systemic risk; supervision of market operators focused on the moral hazard caused by asymmetric information and financial safety net adverse selection problems; market access regulation for information asymmetry generated. Focus on the safety of the entire financial system, financial safety net market operation regulation and market access regulation is based on the resolve the systemic risk in the bud. Practical clues Firstly, from a historical height domestic regulation and international supervision of cross-border banking overall visits, and then selected a few representative countries and regions - the United States, Japan, the European Union, its foreign banks regulatory status quo, and the emphasis on the. Regulatory theory, or the country, the international regulatory practices, historical visits, or the status quo analysis, its aim is to explore and solve the existing problems in the supervision of foreign banks in China. Systemic risks of foreign banks in China from two aspects: First, developed countries, caused by the foreign banks operating risks; second is unique in China, as a developing country, squeezed by foreign banks inherently vulnerable Chinese banks, leading to its closure. Both systemic risk determines the concepts and methods of supervision of foreign banks in China. Regulatory global terms, the regulatory purpose should be to prevent the collapse of a single bank to shift to guard against systemic risk; regulatory goal should be one-sided emphasis on the financial stability to take into account the financial efficiency of transformation; the regulatory orientation should substitution and elimination of the market to improve and supplement market changes; regulatory responsibility should be set at one to disperse in the body transformation of banks, depositors, creditors, industry organizations and other economic entities; regulatory means should be simplified to diversify shift; should be restrictive regulatory approach to risk transition. Specific supervision of foreign banks in terms of market access link, should take the lead in line with international standards, to achieve prudent diversification and access to institutions of access conditions; operational aspects of the market, continue to invoke restrictive regulatory approach gradual establishment of exit links, and gradually establish the risk of market exit mechanism in the market to the capital adequacy ratio of the core to control the risk for the purpose, stressed the prudential supervision of government supervision of foreign banks internal control mechanisms and cultivate the market constraints force; for immediate corrective action of a single bank, the emergency response mechanism to guard against systemic risk, the system of deposit insurance and lender of last resort system in order to achieve the exit in the form of multi-and marketization exit decentralized and cost minimization.