Research on Corporate Merger and Acquisition Pricing Based on Evolutionary Learning
|School||Harbin Institute of Technology|
|Course||Management Science and Engineering|
|Keywords||Corporation merger and acquisition pricing signaling game merger and acquisition gains bidding bargaining|
Corporation merger and acquisition pricing is composed with target firm pricing, merger and acquisition’s gains pricing and merger and acquisition deal pricing. Target firm and merger and acquisition’s gains pricing are the foundation of deal pricing, which can help acquiring firms made efficient price. Merger and acquisition deal pricing is a dynamic game process which distribute the return coming from merger and acquisition activities. In our country, merger and acquisition activities became more and more important with the development of economy and industry, so merger and acquisition pricing is the core element of merger and acquisition activities.Information transmitting, cognitive difference and motives played a very important role in information asymmetry during merger and acquisition. So those factors must be considered in the course of merger and acquisition pricing. The paper use game theory, evolutionary theory and learning theory to study merger and acquisition pricing according to the characteristics of all the factors affecting pricing process.Firstly, the paper use signaling model to study target firm’s pricing, proposed the repeated signaling game model and analyzed the equilibrium. Target firm’s pricing is a kind of decisive behavior based on information disclosure. So the paper introduced the signaling model into target firm’s pricing. The signaling game model in target firm’s pricing included one period signaling game and two period signaling game according to the information disclosure process. After analyzed the difference of two signaling model, the paper developed repeated signaling game model and simulation-reflection evolutionary learning process in order to improve the information asymmetry between acquiring firm and target firm, which will make the target firm’s pricing process more efficient. The paper use evolutionary stable strategy to set up the equilibrium of repeated signaling game.Secondly, the paper developed dynamic pricing model on merger and acquisition return through evolutionary learning theory. Merger and acquisition returns’pricing computed the profit coming from merger and acquisition activities. Because the past studies on merger and acquisition returns mainly concentrated on the abnormal profits of post merger and acquisition which can not help to make the efficient decision. So we study the merger and acquisition returns’pricing in the course of merger and acquisition. The paper analyzed the origin of merger and acquisition return and outer effect of merger and acquisition activities, we found the outer effect changed along to evolutionary path. So we developed the dynamic model under the condition that the player learning the outer effect.Thirdly, the paper studied merger and acquisition deal pricing when several acquiring firm competed for one target firm using auction theory. In auction mechanism, I compared sealed auction, opened auction, one-shot auction and repeated auction from deal efficiency and returns. I found that the opened and repeated auction suited for merger and acquisition. The paper designed two auction bidding mechanisms suited for merger and acquisition activities, which are sequential biding auction mechanism and synchronous bidding auction mechanism. In those bidding auction mechanisms, I developed an evolutionary learning model to analyzing all bidders’strategic evolution.Finally, the paper studied merger and acquisition deal pricing with one acquiring firm and one target firm using bargaining model. I developed comprehensive discount factor of bargaining process through evolutionary learning theory. The comprehensive discount factor considered all the effect during bargaining. I introduced alternated bargain model into negotiating process. I analyzed the solution space in the static bargaining model.