Dissertation
Dissertation > Economic > Fiscal, monetary > Finance, banking > China's financial,banking > Financial market

Research on the Supervision of Internal Control Information Disclosure

Author ZuoJiaQi
Tutor WuGuoPing
School Northeast Normal University
Course Accounting
Keywords internal control information disclosure regulation game theory
CLC F233;F832.51
Type Master's thesis
Year 2011
Downloads 186
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The subprime mortgage and financial crisis, which started in the U.S. and swept the whole world, exposed the disadvantages of commercial banks. Clearly, these institutions are not really in accordance with the“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”and“Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework”developed by COSO Committee. They did not establish effective internal control risk management. Moreover, the opaque disclosure of internal control brought great damages and bad influence to the related industries. In this regard, the external supervision, including government regulation, is hardly to get rid of the blame.There is no improvement of internal control information disclosure of listed companies no matter how harsh the regulations are, because of the supervision are inadequate. In this case, to build efficient regulatory system so that those who manipulate the internal control disclosure can not do what they want to do. This will ensure that the internal control of listed companies playing signaling function effectively and urge listed companies to establish sound internal control system. This can also contribute to building a harmonious stock market, protect investors and ensure their confidence.This paper, based on the use of literature research methods, qualitative and quantitative methods and longitudinal comparison methods, takes three years’consecutive annual report of 61 listed companies of Jilin Province, Liaoning Province and Heilongjiang Province in Shanghai Stock Exchange as the subjects, and studies the published reports of internal control information disclosure.This thesis finds out the problem existed. Moreover, this paper establishes mixed strategy equilibrium and false statement of dynamic game model to rule the optimal degree of regulation, in order to provide empirical evidence to the disclosure of internal control of listed companies’.

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