Research on Evolutionary Game Between Venture Investment Entities
|School||Southwestern University of Finance and Economics|
|Keywords||Venture Investment Evolutionary Game LimitedRationality Nash Equilibrium|
This dissertation studies the game relation between the players in the venture investment respectively from the perspective of game theory. In the game model of venture capitalist and venture investor,firstly,assuming that both of the players are rational,there exists two Nash equilibriums; secondly,under the assumption of limited rationality,the dissertation studies the possible influences of excess profits,initial costs and discount factor towards the success of cooperation of the venture investment.It finds out that excess profits and discount factor have a positive influence towards the cooperation of the game evolution,while the initial costs a negative influence. In the game model of venture investor and venture entrepreneur,the paper discusses the range of numerical value in extraction of parameters under the conditions of one Nash equilibrium and two Nash equilibriums. Also,the dissertation studies the influence of partition coefficients, supervision costs and return towards the collective evolution.under the assumption of limited rationality. Finally,numerical simulation has been made assigning values to the parameters in the theoretical model. The simulational result is consistent with the theoretical model.