Research on Coalition Analysis Based on the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
|School||Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics|
|Course||Management Science and Engineering|
|Keywords||conflict analysis graph model coalition strength preference equilibrium environmentaand resources conflict|
Conflict is a kind of opposite situation in which decision makers with different objectives interact.Based on the classical game theory, equilibrium solutions require accurate preferences. However, inpractice, due to the uncertainty of external environment and the different overview of value, it isdifficult for decision makers to provide accurate preferences. Therefore, the relative preference isoften used by decision makers. The graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) based on the relativepreference is to model the conflict behavior and solve the multiple participant-multiple objectivedecision making problem. Specially, people pay more attention to considering how to form an allianceto achieve “win-win” results. At present, coalition stability analysis is a very challenging problem inGMCR. Therefore, this thesis aims to develop the coalitional stabilities based on GMCR under simplepreference and strength of preference using set theory and graph theory.Firstly, four kinds of coalitional stabilities including coalitional Nash stability, coalitional GMRstability, coalitional SMR stability and coalitional SEQ stability is defined for simple preference inthis thesis; and then the logical relationships among different stabilities are given and proved. Thedefinitions of coalitional stability under the simple preference not only expand the definition of theindividual stabilities, but also expand a transitive graph model to a general graph model.Secondly, the general coalitional stabilities under the strength of preference are also defined, andwe divide the general coalition stabilities into strong coalitional stabilities and weak coalitionalstabilities based on the response of the opponents. At the same time, the logical relationships amongdifferent stabilities are given and proved. The definitions of coalitional stabilities not only expand thedefinition of the individual stabilities under the strength of preference, but also expand the coalitionalstabilities under the simple preference.Finally, the extended coalitional stable model is applied to “the BASFchongqing MDI projectestablished in the three gorges reservoir area” conflict. By simulating the whole conlflict situation, wepropose the coalitional scheme to solve the conflict.The scheme coincides with the actual resolutionof BASFchongqing MDI conflict. And meanwhile, this thesis also proposes a method for solvingconflicts between environment and resources at the strategic level.