Dissertation > Economic > Economic planning and management > Economic calculation, economic and mathematical methods > Economic and mathematical methods > Operations Research in the economy > Game Theory

Research on the Establishment and Perfection of "Compliance and Facilitation" Customs Clearance Management on the Basis of Repeated Game

Author WeiHong
Tutor MengLinMing
School Xiamen University
Course Business Administration
Keywords Repeated Game Customs Compliance and Facilitation
CLC F224.32
Type Master's thesis
Year 2007
Downloads 150
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With the development of international trade, Customs business volume keeps booming. Traditional Customs clearance model emphasizes safeguarding the national gateway. This model, characterized by doubt everything, guard at port and balanced focus, has less and less fit the realistic demand of modern economic and trade. The voice of government agencies and enterprises calling for efficiency improvement of Customs clearance has been louder than any time before. The contradiction between effective surveillance and efficient operation is the major issue in the face of Customs. Customs-to-business partnership, ’Compliance and Facilitation’ has become reform target of the international community. However, several problems still exist due to the impact and restraint of traditional management concept and model. At present, Customs’ management system and method over enterprises has not been totally changed yet. The contradiction between effective surveillance and efficient operation has not been solved entirely. The bottleneck of clearance efficiency improvement still exists. Against the background, this paper applies game theory, which repeated game benefits trust cooperation between the two sides, to the operation of China Customs and put forward suggestions for Customs clearance management in terms of establishing and perfecting ’Compliance and Facilitation’ system.This paper is divided into seven sections. The first section illustrates background and motives of this topic. The second section introduces the limitation of the ’olive’ shaped Customs clearance model. The third section briefs game theory, especially repeated game, which provides theoretical methodology for the following analysis. Decision-making behavior of Customs and enterprises in the process of clearance is analyzed in the fourth section making use of game theory. In the fifth section, Customs-to-business cooperation relationships in the U.S. and Holland are introduced. The sixth section puts forward relevant suggestions on how China Customs could push forward ’Compliance and Facilitation’ clearance management reform. In the seventh section, a conclusion is naturally drawn.The conclusion of this paper is that Customs-to-business partnership is one of the solutions addressing current contradiction. Repeated game is the alternative for Customs and enterprise cooperation. Gaming between Customs and business should be transformed from one-shot game to repeated game. Clearance management model should be changed from ’olive’ shaped to ’spindle’ shaped. The function of auditing should be adjusted from ’case check and make-up duty’ to enterprise honest, trust and law abidance management. Thus, effective encouragement and restraint mechanism should be established which makes full use of enterprises reputation. ’Compliance and Facilitation’ Customs-to-business cooperation model should be ensured on the basis of repeated game.

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