Dissertation > Economic > Economic planning and management > Economic calculation, economic and mathematical methods > Economic and mathematical methods

After controlling shareholder tradable era \

Author ShengZheng
Tutor WangKeMin
School Fudan University
Course Accounting
Keywords Shareholder’s Rights Mounted Cylinder Reform Behaviors of Controlling Shareholders Propping Tunneling the listed companies’ values
CLC F224
Type Master's thesis
Year 2009
Downloads 477
Quotes 5
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This paper focuses on the study of the controlling shareholder’s behaviors comprehensively and deeply in the full circulation background, making use of the case studies, to study the relationship between the listed companies’ values and the controlling shareholder’s behaviors after shareholder’s rights mounted cylinder reform.With the development of modern companies, the controlling shareholder in the role of corporate governance has become important increasingly. The company’s internal principal-agent relationship is not traditional relationship between shareholders and managers, but the principal-agent relationship between external investors and controlling shareholders. Therefore, controlling shareholders’ behavioral pattern this paper engaged in, means "tunneling" and "propping" . The research is based on the changing of the two kinds of behaviors after the reform, as well as studying the impact on the listed companies’ values.In theory at home and abroad has been reviewed and the results of the study, in the view of the special characteristics of the securities market, inspected the changes of controlling shareholder after the share reforming of listed companies in China, this paper divides the controlling shareholder’s actions of listed company in the full circulation times into two categories: propping activities, tunneling activities, and these two types sub-chapter study. On the study of these two parts, analyze the controlling shareholder’s behavior change after the reform of shareholder’s rights mounted cylinder respectively and the impact on the listed companies’ values.After that, we draw our conclusion that, shareholder’s right mounted cylinder reform will boost supervision level of controlling shareholders, reduce the possibility of their occupation of corporate assets directly or indirectly through "tunneling" behaviors .Therefore, agency costs will be cut down and company values will be added. Meanwhile, shareholder’s right mounted cylinder reform can’t eliminate the occurrence of "tunneling" behavior. Therefore, in order to promote the support of the controlling shareholder fundamentally, to restrict the occupation behaviors of the controlling shareholders, we should enhance the company’s growth ability, to start from improving the corporate governance structure, protecting the rights and interests of small shareholderseffectively.

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