A Study on Measure Method of Private Benefits of Control of Listing Company in China
|School||Shenyang University of Technology|
|Keywords||Control transfer Private benefits Transfer premium|
Private benefits of control transfer brought out from the control over corporate resources has become a core content in modern governance. In the situation of separation of ownership and management, the interests of controlling shareholder and minority shareholders conflict, controlling shareholder can take advantage of control over corporate to obtain private benefits beyond securities investment benefits belonging to all shareholders, which are only owned by controlling shareholders.Obtaining private benefits of control transfer not only harms the benefits of minority shareholders, but also decreases corporate value and growth potentiality. Reasonable measurement on control private benefits can both help understand severity of harming behavior of controlling shareholders and further study influence factors and mechanism of control private benefits.Private benefits of control obtained by controlling shareholders come in a variety form and are of invisibility, and it is difficult to take direct measurement method. Indirect measurement on control transfer premium are usually adopted abroad. And system environments of listed companies in China have their particularity. This makes us unable to use foreign measure methods directly but in accordance with actual status to analyze. This paper compares and analyzes varieties of measure methods on the basis of current research results and brings about improvement measure method of equity transfer premium.This paper shows that improved measure method of equity transfer premium is the proper way for measuring private benefits of control transfer in China on the condition of special backgrounds of control transfer in Chinese listing companies. The empirical results in Chinese listing companies from 2004 to 2006 show that, on average, private benefits of control transfer contributes 34.5% of owner’s equity. The paper also finds that control structure and characteristics of control transfer influence bargaining powers of both parties, which also dominate private benefits obtained by both parties.