A Study on Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanism Designing for Enterprise Alliance
|Keywords||Enterprise Alliance Incentives Collusion Principal-agent Team Production|
Enterprise Alliance is a competing form of organization, and the organization of two more independent enterprises to cooperate with each other. The Enterprise Alliance opportunist risk is high, which involves a special control and incentive problems. However, the incentives in the Union is different from the principal-agent theory of unilateral incentive, but the mutual encouragement between alliance enterprises, it is necessary from the perspective of an inspection. In this paper, the use of information economics, cooperative game theory and the theory of Enterprise Alliance system to study the incentives in the Union and its related problems, influence the distribution of benefits in the Union, mutual encouragement and collusion problem. First of all, through the introduction of team welfare function, we build a team production incentive model (which contains the principal-agent model as a special case), and investigated the characteristics of the model solution. Then, we will apply this model to the Enterprise Alliance incentives designed, respectively chief and members of the Union and Equality Alliance incentive model, as well as knowledge of Union Equity Alliance incentive model, and through the introduction of the anti-collusion mechanism construct anti-collusion mutual incentive model. Finally, we look at the implementation of the anti-collusion incentives, given a sufficient condition of the existence of incentive model, and pointed out that the existence of the dynamic game balancing. This study shows that: autonomous work teams, mutual agency relationship exists between team members, and thus need to motivate each other to overcome such lazy moral hazard and free-rider. Incentives between the team members can benefit-sharing scheme, the allocation rules of interest to characterize the team welfare function, it is a cooperative game solution in theory. By the introduction of team welfare function, the principal-agent model to promote mutual incentive model. In order to prevent the collusion of some members in the team, we need to introduce anti-conspiracy mechanisms. Given the minimum payment combination of team members located in the nucleus of a great conspiracy, can prevent collusion occurred. The introduction of anti-collusion mechanism mutual incentive model, you can create the anti-collusion mutual incentive model. The anti conspiracy mutual incentive model solution does not necessarily exist. Nevertheless, we give a sufficient condition for its existence. In particular, if the dissolution of the Union is also regarded as a balanced, with anti-conspiracy incentive model corresponding to the dynamic game balancing is always there. If the anti-conspiracy incentive model equilibrium exists, then the equalizer can always achieve this is due to the mechanism designer has the first-mover advantage, he can always be pre-selected a balanced and shall be implemented, thus multiple equilibria problem does not exist.