A Study on the Effect of Company Performance and Equity Properties on Top Manager Turnover
|School||Chongqing University of Technology|
|Keywords||Top manager turnover Company performance Equity properties|
Company executive change is not only the important supervision mechanism, but also it is the important index of management efficiency. Effective corporate governance can not only change top manger in time because of poor performance, it will also help the company find appropriate executive’s successor. Along with our country economy growing continuously, a lot of listed company erupted executives change events repeatedly. This phenomenon has caused the focus of the society, especially the reason of change and the influence to the listed company. And the listed firms in our country mostly come from restructured state-owned enterprise,which modern scientific management system has not completely established, internal system and corporate governance mechanism are not perfect. So, whether the listed company executives change,in extent, reflected the efficiency of corporate governance in China? These executives change events whether it helps promote the improvement of corporate governance quality? Based on the listed companies in China as the research object, the paper study two factors-performance and equity properties in detail to the influence of executives change,which can cause important significance for enhance of company governance,for forming of manager market,for improvement of motivation mechanism.By the division to performance, Positive results prove that compared with other performance, executives in ST condition are more likely to change. At the same time, executives turnover of eecellent company do not reduce sensibility to performance,instead ,it enhance the sensibility to performance.The paper studys top managers not only as a whole, but also the executives are divided into the chairman and general manager. results confirm both are not the same to the sensitivity of performance, general manager is higher to the sensitivity of the performance than the chairman of the board.By the division to equity properties , Empirical results confirme that executives change with state-owned properties is lower to the sensitivity of performance than non-state-owned nature,but also significantly.In addition,on the basis of the state-owned properties, according to the company whether to belong to monopoly industry, the state-owned properties company is divided into state-owned monopoly company and state-owned non-monopoly company. This is also one of the innovation points in this paper. Through the relevant empirical analysis, executive change of state-owned monopoly company is far lower to the sensitivity of performance than other types of company.By related analysis,the paper consider that it should perfect the following things to promote the improvement of company governace: (1) Take different motivation mechanism to top managers of different company;(2) Bring in appropriate competion to reform executives appointed way in the state-owned monopoly industry;(3) continue deeply stock rights reform;(4) Strengthen position of board of directors and board of supervisors;(5) Cultivate and develop manager market.