Research on the Factos of Long-term of M&A in Differnet Equity Properties
|School||Chongqing University of Technology|
|Keywords||Equity properties Board governance the Long-term of M&A listed company|
Merger and acquisition (M&A) which is considered to be one of efficient ways to help enterprise achieve expansion is always a hot issue in domestic and foreign academic. Which the completion of The Equity Division Reform,the demanding of the listed companies and the introduction of related policies and regulations,the merger and acquisition activities will be more frequent. The success or failure of M&A does not depend on whether it complete, but whether through M&A to achieve the expected business performance and achieve strategic objectives. In addition, as the strategic decision of firms, many studies have shown that M&A activity must and is closely related to corporate governance. Board governance is the core of corporate governance, which plays a crucial role whether before the making of decision, the implementation of M&A or the integration of resources after the M&A. Since the difference of the corporate governance between state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies, there must be differs between their board governance. So it is worthy of study that whether the impact of long-term performance of M&A caused by differ of board governance is different between the two kinds of companies. Based on the above considerations, we make empirical research on the correlation between board governance and M&A long-term performance of two kinds of companies.This paper combine normative research with empirical research and base on relative theories, analyze differences between of two kinds of companies’board governance firstly. At the same time, using two kinds of companies which had M&A activity in 2006 as sample and we employ the principal component analysis of factor analysis then get the component scores which spend for performance of M&A. Then, we make the empirical study on the correlation between board governance and long-term performance of M&A and make a comparison with the outcome of the two kinds of companies. The result shows that the board governance of state-owned listed companies and of non-state-owned listed companies are different, which cause the affect of performance of M&A are significantly different. The share proportions of the board members, the frequency of the board meeting and the general meeting of shareholder are positively correlated with long-term performance of M&A of state-owned listed companies, but to non-state-owned listed companies, these are negatively correlated with the long-term performance of M&A. In addition, to non-state-owned listed companies, the board size, the rate of independent directors, the share proportions of the largest shareholder and the dualing of chairman and general manager are all positively correlated with performance of M&A and are all significant; But to state-owned listed companies, although the direction of influence is same with non-state-owned listed companies, except the board size and the share proportions of largest shareholder, other factors are all not significant.At length, according to the above conclusion, this paper puts forward many suggestions to two kinds of companies about how to improve long-term performance of M&A from the perspective of board governance and takes an outlook for the research.