Construction and Countermeasures model of the solution of the cooperative game under the new guidelines for the optimal
|Keywords||NTU countermeasures Weakly dominant Union Split Joint response PGN vector|
This paper is divided into three chapters . Chapter for non-transferable classic static cooperative game utility countermeasures (NTU countermeasures ) to establish the concept of weakly dominant weakly stable set refining payment NTU countermeasures core , and all can not be weak excellent ultra- paid collection of all core weakly stable set of three . Chapters II and III in the limited extended countermeasures on the basis of complete information . The players to maintain their own interests of the alliance for a code of conduct , and that is to take the strategy to make it in the total receipts of the Union . The definition of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium optimal reaction , and the principle of the establishment of the characteristic function , in the case of the players on the requirements of individual rationality can not be guaranteed by Nuclear (Nucleolus) create a dynamic optimal countermeasures in solution , given the optimal solution and the optimal path algorithm . The second chapter of the specific research limited dynamic cooperative game with complete information and changes in coalition structure . For randomly changing the dynamic response of the Union split on a finite number of nodes in the countermeasures tree given its dynamic optimal solution the PGN vector , and gives the algorithm for optimal path through the introduction of a new characteristic function and optimal criteria . Chapter specific research limited expansion joint response with full information . For the formation of the first stage began in countermeasures Union split process all possible joint response to construct optimal coalition split . By introducing a new characteristic function and optimal criteria , to establish dynamic optimal solution the PGN vector , given the optimal path algorithm .